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We  present the results of a structured discussion held in London in July 2014 involving a
panel  of experts drawn from three communities: specialists on aspects of risk and insurance;
lawyers concerned with issues of nuclear law; and safety and environmental regulators. The
discussions were held on the basis of participant anonymity. The process emphasised three
considerations: conceptions of loss arising from a severe nuclear accident; the speciﬁcs of
the Fukushima-Daiichi accident and what it means for policy and strategy going forward;
and  the future of liability regimes. We observe some stoicism from those closest to imple-
mentation of policies and procedures associated with nuclear risks, but a lower level of
certainty and conﬁdence among those concerned with nuclear energy regulation.
©  2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of Institution of Chemical
Engineers. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.
org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1.  Introduction
On Friday 11 March 2011, a magnitude 9 earthquake occurred in the
Paciﬁc Ocean approximately 70 km from the eastern coast of Japan’s
main island Honshu. The resulting tsunami overwhelmed the defences
protecting four of the reactors of the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear power
station. One of these four reactors was undergoing maintenance at the
time. Unable to maintain post-shutdown reactor cooling for the three
operational reactors, core overheating occurred and when nuclear fuel
cladding reacted with high temperature steam hydrogen was formed
which accumulated and exploded. As a result of various structural
problems, some exacerbated by the explosions, radioactive contamina-
tion was propelled into the atmosphere forming a plume that travelled
primarily to the northwest overland before being deposited. As a pre-
caution a large programme of immediate evacuation and extended
population relocation was undertaken (Ranghieri and Ishiwatari, 2014).
The Fukushima-Daiichi disaster was the second time that such an
approach has been adopted. The ﬁrst arose in 1986 following the even
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more severe nuclear power accident at Chernobyl in the Ukraine (Smith
and Beresford, 2005).
The events that gave rise to the hydrogen explosions (namely loss
of effective core cooling and high temperature fuel-cladding steam
interactions) at Fukushima-Daiichi are well-known within the nuclear
industry and were not dissimilar to the problems encountered at
Three Mile Island nuclear power station in Pennsylvania USA in 1979,
although in that case the release of radioactive contamination was far
smaller, verging on negligible (Kemeny, 1979).
Given prior related experiences at Chernobyl and Three Mile Island
one might take the view that fundamentally there is little to be learned
from considering policy and strategy responses to the Fukushima-
Daiichi disaster. The Nuclear Risks: Environmental, Financial, and Safety
(NREFS) research consortium took the view that there are indeed fresh
lessons to be learned. Much of the work of NREFS has concerned
quantitative assessments to examine the logical basis for population
relocation policies following a severe accident. Other considerations
have related to nuclear power plant siting (Grimston et al., 2014),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.psep.2016.12.008
0957-5820/© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of Institution of Chemical Engineers. This is an open access article
under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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nuclear liability regimes post Fukushima-Daiichi (Heffron et al., 2016),
off-site emergency procedures and responses to nuclear accidents
(Ashley et al., 2017a), the economic consequences of a hypothetical
nuclear accident in the UK (Ashley et al., 2017b), and policy responses
and strategies to restore and adjust electricity systems following dra-
matic capacity reduction, as has occurred in Japan since March 2011
(Haarscher et al., 2014).
This paper presents a synthesis of a round table discussion panel
which was held to elicit the lessons learnt from Fukushima-Daiichi
and to identify questions that may become relevant in a future nuclear
accident from the perspective of insurance and risk, an area where atti-
tudes have also evolved since the accident at Fukushima-Daiichi. The
event comprised eleven UK-based experts within the ﬁelds of nuclear
insurance and risk, nuclear law, and nuclear regulation.
In the title of this paper we refer to an expert elucidation. We  con-
cede this is reminiscent of a more established phrase: expert elicitation.
We hope that the distinction serves a beneﬁcial purpose. Our approach
is similar to an expert elicitation, but unlike most such exercises we
had no intention to uncover new data or to reﬁne quantitative esti-
mates of established parameters. Rather we sought entirely qualitative
insights that would add clarity to existing understanding of a complex
topic, i.e. to elucidate.
2.  Material  damage  and  third-party  liability
Our expert elucidation centred on issues surrounding insur-
ance and risk which have evolved since the accident at
Fukushima-Daiichi. Insurance and risk associated with the
energy sector can be broadly divided between on-site risks and
insurance (termed ‘material damage’) and off-site risks and
insurance (termed ‘third-party liability’). Three themes were
identiﬁed in the area of material damage and third-party lia-
bility insurance in the nuclear energy sector and were used to
guide the discussion of the expert elucidation that is further
detailed in Section 3. These themes are:
2.1.  ‘Loss’  arising  from  a  nuclear  accident
Loss may be deﬁned by various legal conventions for various
jurisdictions, however, exactly deﬁning what the losses would
be following a nuclear accident, and determining and provid-
ing adequate recompense for those who have suffered loss
are all far from straight-forward. The potential for such a loss
affects our aversion to today’s and tomorrow’s risks, and our
ability to disentangle the rational and emotional response to
a hypothetical event as distinct from an actual event. There-
fore, the main question here was to ascertain what does ‘loss’
mean in the context of a nuclear accident for those with a
practitioner perspective?
2.2.  Claims  management
After a nuclear accident, two actions need to begin as soon as
possible: (1) an efﬁcient and effective emergency management
response; and (2) a claims management process. This is not
only of beneﬁt for the victims, but also part of the justice sys-
tem, where victims should be returned to their pre-accident
position as much as it is possible. However, from an industry
perspective there will be a desire to restore public trust, and
the public reputation of the industry in the country where the
accident occurs and also crucially at an international level.
There are several questions that arose here. In reﬂecting on
the Fukushima accident in Japan in 2011, what is the practi-
tioner perspective on the emergency management response
and claims management process following the accident? How
did the international community respond to that event? What
would be the important issues for the UK to consider regarding
the claims management process and in particular if there were
transboundary issues (for example, with Ireland, Denmark,
and/or Continental Europe)? What role will ‘timeliness’ play in
the process, and what institution could process the potential
high volume of claims?
2.3.  Liability  regimes
The ability to compensate victims is certain to be a promi-
nent issue after any nuclear accident. This is not just a nuclear
speciﬁc problem, for example, at the time of writing, BP is still
aiming to reduce its liability for the Deepwater Horizon spill in
the Gulf of Mexico in 2010. However, a nuclear accident may
result in different set of issues, in particular due to the dis-
persion and dissemination of radioactive materials. This is
an area where there were many  questions. How will losses
be classiﬁed for different communities affected by a nuclear
accident? For those within an exclusion zone it may be more
straight-forward to compensate (as they would have suffered
a ‘direct’ loss) but what will happen to nearby communities
who after a nuclear accident suffer loss of income or liveli-
hood in areas where there was no radiological damage and no
enforced evacuation (and as such could have suffered only an
‘indirect’ loss)? Do today’s liability regimes sufﬁciently address
and recompense those who have suffered direct and indirect
losses? Do these liability regimes lead to a better or worse set
of policies for the governance and regulation of future nuclear
power plants?
3.  The  expert  elucidation
On 17 July, 2014 the authors gathered a community of experts
to London for a round-table discussion on the effect of the
accident at Fukushima-Daiichi on insurance and risk. Experts
were drawn from three principal communities: specialists on
aspects of risk and insurance; lawyers concerned with issues
of nuclear law; and safety and environmental regulators. The
discussions were held on the basis that those speaking would
not be identiﬁed nor would organisations and afﬁliations be
disclosed. For that reason this paper will not disclose the pre-
cise sources of the ideas presented. While there may be beneﬁt
to be gained from a greater level of transparency it was felt that
this would be outweighed by the self-imposed constraints that
would inevitably arise if the discussions were to be attributed.
A decision was made in favour of a less restrained sharing of
ideas and concerns.
The discussions covered broadly three related areas of con-
cern:
(1) The loss arising from a severe nuclear accident;
(2) The speciﬁcs of the Fukushima-Daiichi accident and what
it means for policy and strategy going forward; an
(3) The future of liability regimes.
The discussion was such that in each case the moderator
(Professor Nuttall) invited a named individual to speak before
opening up the discussion to everybody for further comment.
In each case, the named individual was not obliged to make
any comment. Verbatim extracts from the expert elucidation
are presented in Appendix A.
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3.1.  Loss
In the opening phase of the group discussion, the experts were
asked to consider what the term “loss” meant to them, from
their professional experience and practice, in the context of a
severe nuclear accident. The ﬁrst expert invited to speak came
from the professional area of risk and insurance. The discus-
sion revealed that a natural focus for a risk and insurance
professional was not on the broad and somewhat nebulous
considerations of all the impacts of an event, but rather on
the bounded, speciﬁc and quantiﬁed amount of compensa-
tion due to provide formal recompense for an insured loss
[Appendix A Boxes 1.1 and 1.3].
Those with a regulatory perspective were quick to acknowl-
edge the importance of losses that would not be compensated.
They opened the issue further still by introducing considera-
tion of a “perceived loss”. It was also suggested that the scale
of uncompensated loss could be larger than that which would
be compensated for by insurers or government [Appendix A
Box 1.2].
The discussion provided evidence of a difference of per-
spective between insurers and those responsible for public
policy. The insurers are focussed on formal contractual
responsibilities, whereas regulators exhibit a much greater
concern for political and social expectations going beyond
what might be captured by contractual frameworks.
Noting the introduction of the idea that perceptions could
be important, at this point the moderator encouraged a broad-
ening of the issues under consideration by observing that:
whatever conception we might have of loss today, is that going to
be the opinion shared by the press or the Prime Minister in the weeks
following a severe accident?
Two  legal experts responded, the ﬁrst by reminding the
other participants that when considering notions of “loss” one
should not just look out to the domain of third-party losses,
but one should also remember the material damage losses to
the plant itself [Appendix A Box 2.1].
The second legal voice suggested that the practice of clas-
sifying losses according to a “heads of damage” was a useful
framework for clear thinking in a complex space of ideas. In
essence, the legal experts reminded the meeting that there are
several aspects to be considered and that these are managed
via different processes and tribunals. Some aspects may not be
as clear-cut as perhaps the insurers would like to believe, but
nevertheless frameworks should, could and would be applied
in practice [Appendix A Box 2.1].
A regulatory expert did not disagree but added that the
important thing in a major accident scenario could be pub-
lic expectations and a general desire among those affected
for life to get back to normal [Appendix A Box 2.2]. Neverthe-
less, the insurance and risk experts reminded the discussants
that, as those at the heart of the practicalities following any
accident, above all what they seek and require is clarity of
responsibilities and requirements [Appendix A Box 2.3].
In conclusion, we  can see a clear difference of view between
those whose regulatory responsibility it is to minimise the
chance of an accident occurring. Simply put, their approach
is more  all-encompassing and philosophical, as compared
with those whose task would be to compensate for insured
losses following an accident. The insurance and risk special-
ists gravitate to more  speciﬁc and quantiﬁable concerns and
have a focus on practicalities. Arguably, the legal experts sit in
between, comfortable with a broad range of considerations,
but keen that any discussion be structured and clear. The
authors see merit and utility in these differing approaches,
but suggest that the evidence emerging from the exercise is
that a sharing of perspectives can generate deeper awareness,
and potentially synergise useful insights, for each individual
expert community and for the set of stakeholder communities
as a whole.
3.2.  The  response  to  the  Fukushima-Daiichi  accident
In the second phase of the elucidation, the expert panel mem-
bers were asked to consider the emergency management
response following the Fukushima-Daiichi accident and to
comment on the claims management processes that applied
in that case. The regulators were keen to comment on the
appropriateness of policy in such circumstances.
A regulatory expert proposed a useful division between
responses in the immediate aftermath of an accident. Essen-
tially, this involves a pre-prepared emergency plan and
longer-term, more  responsive longer-term measures which
might involve near-permanent population relocation, as
opposed to merely temporary evacuation [Appendix A Box
3.1]. In response to these ideas, a risk and insurance expert
commented on the importance of the practicalities and for-
ward planning, for example in claims handling, and pointed to
the importance of advance planning and emergency exercises
[Appendix A Box 3.2].
The moderator observed that one might have a set of stake-
holders who may have suffered a loss, or perceive that they
have suffered some kind of harm, but perhaps there is no clear
or viable route available to them so that they might receive
monetary compensation. More generally, he asked, is the com-
pensation process in Japan working at a practical level?
A risk and insurance expert offered two observations in
response. First, the Japanese situation was interesting in that
the insurance cover did not extend to earthquake and tsunami
risk and as such the Fukushima-Daiichi accident was not
“an insurance event”. He added that many  nuclear power
plants are uninsured for “grave natural disasters”, as these
are excluded from some liability conventions. Second, while
the Fukushima-Daiichi accident was not an insurance event,
individuals from the insurance sector are involved because of
their knowledge, experience and practical skills, and provide
practical services to the Japanese commission compensat-
ing for losses. In a grave natural disaster, one could expect
that compensation funds would ﬂow from government but be
administered by skilled personnel from the insurance sector
[Appendix A Box 3.3]
With such comments, it is noted that insurers play a beneﬁ-
cial role following a severe accident even in those cases where
they are not responsible for paying out on claims. Seeking con-
ﬁrmation on this point the moderator asked: “would I be right
in thinking that, generally, insurance pools around the world stand
ready to assist in the practicalities of claims management, even in
those cases where the loss would not in fact rest with them?” A risk
and insurance expert replied: “I’m sure they would. There are
fewer events than you would think that wouldn’t come under the
insurance. It’s just unfortunate that you picked an example where,
you know, there was a non-insured event as such.”
One can ask: what did the world learn from the Fukushima-
Daiichi accident that was not already known? This expert
discussion provides an insight into one aspect of new learn-
ing. The Fukushima-Daiichi accident was arguably interesting
and novel because it was a major nuclear accident where
the initiating event was not within the nuclear power plant
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itself. Policy-makers have been learning from that reality since
the events of March 2011, and the discussion reported above
touches upon the importance of that reality in the matter
of compensation for loss. That said, the Japanese context is
rather special and should not necessarily be regarded as typ-
ical of what might be expected to occur if there were to be a
severe accident in, for example, Europe. A regulatory expert
made an observation to this effect when he observed that
he thought it unlikely that a future severe nuclear accident
would turn out not to be an “insurance event”. His sugges-
tion was most severe accidents would indeed be “insurance
events” [Appendix A Box 3.4].
At this point the moderator sought opinion on the interna-
tional response to the Fukushima-Daiichi accident. Regulatory
experts tended to the view that several international and
Japanese responses could now be seen to have been an over-
reaction, based on an excessively precautionary approach.
Arguably a similarly overly precautionary approach can be
seen in the Chernobyl response [Appendix A Box 3.5].
As authors we  posit that perhaps one should not solely
regard any over-reaction as an excess of precaution, but one
might also consider the possibility of more  political consider-
ations affecting things, such as a need for government to be
seen to be doing something. Such issues are not taken to a
full conclusion by our work. Of course, in respect of the acci-
dent at Fukushima-Daiichi, the UK government reaction was
an international reaction and a regulatory expert was careful
to point out that he saw no evidence of a British over-reaction
[Appendix A Box 3.5].
3.3.  Transboundary  issues
The moderator then sought to move the panellists’ thoughts
beyond the case of Fukushima-Daiichi to consider trans-
boundary issues and scenarios where, for example, a
radioactive plume travels across national boundaries as hap-
pened after the Chernobyl disaster in 1986.
A risk and insurance expert conﬁrmed that this was indeed
an area of great current interest shaping, for example, thinking
around the Revised Paris Convention [Appendix A Box 4.1].
A legal expert warned that we  must not forget the prac-
tical challenges involved in resolving these problems. In this
context, Fukushima has been challenging and a more  inter-
national event would be even more  challenging as there are
multiple conventions in operation, and some countries are not
signed up to any convention [Appendix A Box 4.2].
The moderator responded by noting that the Irish Republic
is an example of a country not signed up to any international
convention on third-party nuclear liability. In that situation,
there may be a risk that its citizens and institutions might
seek compensation through the courts and that they might
pile into, for example, the British court system if there were to
have been a British accident affecting Ireland. Such a scenario
would be additionally troubling as the UK court system would
surely have been busy enough before the nuclear accident
happened.
A legal expert agreed, conﬁrming the observation that enti-
ties in states, such as Ireland, that had not signed up to the
Paris Convention might seek to bring international claims
through the convention. It was noted that lawyers had started
to talk of the emergence, in effect, of a “global liability regime”
although such a regime is still very far from being complete
[Appendix A Box 4.3].
A risk and insurance expert added that he thought it
unlikely that any a future accident would ever produce “a
ﬂood” of international transboundary claims [Appendix A
Box 4.4]. A legal expert responded by saying that, while he
agreed in principle, one must remember that some countries
are more  litigious than others. He also added one must not
forget the impact of nuclear infrastructure investments on
the international relations within a region. There has been
much European political experience of “transboundary issues”
[Appendix A Box 4.5].
A risk and insurance expert added that his sector had a rel-
atively good and improving grip on transboundary issues. The
conventions are important, but are necessarily less precise
than the arrangements considered by insurers for transbound-
ary claims management. Things are moving forward arguably
even towards a global regime [Appendix A Box 4.6].
A regulatory expert stressed the importance of a timely
response to an accident [Appendix A Box 4.7]. A speedy
response can greatly improve the victim’s experience. There
is a beneﬁcial role for prompt ex-gratia payments that can
reduce negative impacts and can build trust.
Risk and insurance experts responded, one expert pointed
to the conventions saying they should help with speedy settle-
ment. In addition the conventions are bringing in more  heads
of damage, so more  types of loss could be compensated via
the conventions which presumably is a good thing [Appendix
A Box 4.8]. Another risk and insurance expert added that the
speed of compensation is improved if the insurance specialists
are allowed to be present in the emergency room managing the
incident [Appendix A Box 4.8].
Regulatory experts continued to be interested in where
the boundary is located between a loss or harm caused by
the nuclear incident and things which should reasonably be
regarded as out of scope for regulation and compensation. For
example, a negative psychological impact could be triggered
by the incident in some vulnerable people while “reasonable
people” might be unaffected. Should impacts on the psycho-
logically vulnerable be an issue of policy concern [Appendix
A Box 4.9]? In this way it became clear that the policy issues
might not be as clear cut as the insurance experts had been
suggesting based on their more  focussed concerns centred on
compensation.
There were two boundaries in the minds of the experts in
respect of the topic of “loss”. One was the notion of what
should be regarded as a loss and those things that should
or could not be handled by policy. The other aspect con-
cerned political geography and transboundary issues: the idea
of international legal cases being presented by harmed entities
in a third-party country (outside the international conven-
tions) in the courts of a country that had been the location
of a nuclear accident. The moderator was keen to hear if
the experts thought that such suits would have a chance of
success? A legal expert commented that it would depend on
the speciﬁc circumstances but one might be able to make a
successful tort claim arguing a breach in a duty of care or
negligence [Appendix A Box 4.10]. In response an anecdo-
tal intervention was made by one of the risk and insurance
experts:
“I don’t know if this is an apocryphal story or not, but Three Mile
Island, you know, there were a number of claims that were made
by people living on the West Coast for psychological damage as a
consequence of Three Mile Island on the East Coast. Now,  I don’t
know how the American legislature works, but I would hope that
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if a similar thing happened in the UK, you know, the court would
throw it out.”
Closing this phase, a regulatory voice responded and made
a link back to the earlier discussion of boundedness in other
the sense, i.e. concerning the scope of what might be consid-
ered a loss:
“We do know, I think, that people are more fearful of the harm
from radiation than from other sources of harm, which are on the
same level, and that might be seen as unreasonable.”
In summary, there remain areas of policy ambiguity con-
cerning the scope and extent of loss that should be addressed
by policy, including for instance psychological harm, partic-
ularly to vulnerable individuals such as those with mental
illness or simply prone to irrational thinking. While there was
a level of comfort provided by the international conventions
concerning transboundary issues there was some residual
concern and uncertainty regarding transboundary impacts in
non-convention countries and whether this could open up the
risk of large scale transboundary litigation in some circum-
stances. Finally it was noted that anxiety issues can arise very
far from any location of actual physical harm and surely policy
should not fall into a trap of compensating such long-distance
perceived harm.
3.4.  BP  Macondo  incident  2010—lessons  there?
Of course the nuclear industry is not the only sector with
the potential to cause widespread harm and disruption. The
moderator was keen to hear from the experts whether use-
ful lessons might be learned, for example, from the 2010 BP
Macondo incident in the Gulf of Mexico associated with the
problems at the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig. The moder-
ator observed that the oil company BP had limited liability1
but nevertheless chose to make payments far beyond that
limit. He introduced the topic with the words “there was a cap,
which BP let be ignored. Also what I understand from the experi-
ence around Macondo is that a lot of people got compensated, even
though, arguably, they didn’t have a very good claim”.
Various legal experts commented on this point. One
observed that while BP had gone far beyond what was arguably
required in offering compensation its response was shaped by
two factors, which may not transfer to the nuclear sector. The
ﬁrst was the nature of the business (end-customer facing in
competitive retail markets) and the second been the amounts
of cash available to the business. BP could afford to make
the large payments without risking bankruptcy. Bankruptcy
would help no-one in such circumstances [Appendix A Box
5.1]. A risk and insurance expert responded by saying that for
a nuclear accident scenario, liability is clear cut and becom-
ing clearer still. This expert did not see parallel ambiguities
of responsibility and accountability in a nuclear scenario and
concluded by noting that much of the political and media pres-
sure surrounding an accident could be seen not as a desire for
proper legal mitigation and compensation, but more  as an act
of Schadenfreude [Appendix A Box 5.2].
Here we  see again stoicism from those most connected
with matters of risk and insurance and a wider set of con-
cerns around possible scenario developments from the legal
experts.
1 As discussed further in Heffron et al. (2016).
3.5.  Trust,  fear  and  responsibility
One of the risk and insurance experts was keen to clarify the
issues raised by the proceeding discussions by observing that
in the UK, direct losses, including psychological harm, were
very likely to be handled efﬁciently and with little ambiguity
requiring interpretation by the courts. Indirect losses would
be held to be out of scope, for instance psychological aspects
with no direct connection to the accident [Appendix A Box 6.1].
The moderator remarked: “But do you think it’s sufﬁcient for
the process to consist of a letter from the insurance community that
says ‘Thank you for your claim but, sorry, it is denied,’ and that’s
the only process, or do you think that the country needs to do more
to manage the disappointment, the anxiety, the fear of these people
who think they’re affected when maybe they’re not?”. A regulatory
voice responded by suggesting that they should, but not after
the event, before the event. The moderator suggested that this
might imply a role for government.
A risk and insurance expert agreed with the beneﬁts to be
obtained in acting in advance of any incident and work has
been done, but getting the message across of the real risks
of radiation has not been easy in the face of fear and vague
associations in people’s minds with nuclear war [Appendix A
Box 6.2]. A legal expert agreed that much work had been done
and it was good work. It was important to remember the cur-
rent openness of the nuclear industry compared to how things
were in the 1980s [Appendix A Box 6.3]. To which regulatory
voices responded ﬁrst by saying that it could be argued that
precautionary approaches in accident management had led
to an unwarranted increase in public anxiety about nuclear
power. Another regulatory voice stressed the importance of
media actions following a major accident as being important
for the best outcome in all of the domains of the meeting’s
consideration [Appendix A Box 6.4].
The moderator remarked that today we have global media
and the internet—it is not as it was in the 1960s when nuclear
power ﬁrst started. A regulatory expert agreed suggesting that
this reality worsened the problems that might be faced by
those attempting to manage the response to a severe accident
[Appendix A Box 6.5]. Another regulatory voice stressed the
importance of public expectations in this regard [Appendix A
Box 6.5].
At this point the moderator introduced a provocative ques-
tion in a UK context: “is our liability regime ﬁt for purpose?”
Signiﬁcantly, a regulatory expert responded “Well, the fact
that the Paris Convention is being redone and then the Nuclear Instal-
lation Act is being redone must say that it’s not ﬁt for purpose at the
moment because it’s being changed. I mean, otherwise, there’d be no
need to change it, so I would have thought that it’s self-evident that
it’s not ﬁt for purpose at the present time.”
3.6.  Blight
The ﬁnal topic considered by the experts concerned “blight”.
The panellists were invited to imagine a scenario with a place
where nobody’s health was affected at all. Nothing bad had
happened to them in any rational sense. Is there an issue
of a zone of people whose lives are adversely affected in our
irrational world, and who would not, as things stand, receive
conventional compensation? Might they be living in a zone of
blight?
A risk and insurance expert observed: “This might well be
an area where you would have a class action because the cover pro-
vided by the insurer may well not include this, because there’s no
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blight as such. There’s no actual thing, but the Government told you
to get out so therefore you’d have a class action against the Govern-
ment because they were the people who told you to get out, or the
policeman, or whoever it was that said.”
In response the moderator suggested: “Imagine there was no
advice to leave and they left anyway, and now they claim their house
is worthless”.  To which the insurance expert responded that
in a UK context mere  blight would never be compensated. A
regulatory view was heard in response: “Remember, in the con-
text of Chernobyl, there were a very large number of people who had
very small doses, living within areas of relatively low contamination,
who, according to certain criteria, were able to be termed formally
‘Chernobyl victims’, and, as a result, got a whole range of beneﬁts,
including things like free holidays. So, you know, that may be rele-
vant in terms of ‘blight’ can mean even more, and it can also have
some positives.”
It would appear there are a range of issues here that could
prove troublesome to policy-makers. In a UK context it is
important to reﬂect on the importance of home ownership on
real and perceived individual wealth. Any erosion of property
prices attributable to the accident could be politically difﬁ-
cult, even in a clear situation of no legal entitlement to any
compensation.
4.  Conclusions
One round-table discussion cannot be expected to solve com-
plex policy problems, but it can help us better appreciate
whether they exist and provide some greater clarity concern-
ing key issues. As as a consequence of the research we see
a clear difference between the stoicism of those closest to
implementation of policies and procedures associated with
nuclear risks and the greater sense of uncertainty coming from
those concerned with nuclear energy regulation. Frequently
the concerns of regulators relate to the boundedness of the
problem. The boundary of responsibility may, or may not, be
deﬁned in law, but even when things might appear to be clear
ex-ante, following a severe nuclear accident political pressures
can be expected to be important. The nature of political inﬂu-
ence and its power will depend upon the accident scenario.
The expert elucidation described here was merely a ﬁrst
step in our research in this area. We intend to follow this
work with surveys of a larger number of selected experts that
allow for an improved and more  detailed understanding. We
also seek to bring in consideration of different national per-
spectives and approaches. Another possible area of additional
further work could be to examine the evolution of nuclear
insurance law and practice compared to the evolving experi-
ence of terrorism insurance. Similar to nuclear risks, terrorism
insurance has a history of policy exclusions and of state par-
ticipation.
In closing we  see potential for greater academic research
and scholarship concerning the consequences of severe
nuclear accidents and the practical actions to be taken in such
a scenario. The research presented here suggests that various
expert communities concerned with such matters have differ-
ing levels of stoicism and concern. They see the issues rather
differently. Through expanded communication and under-
standing we hope that better preparedness and resilience can
be achieved in advance of any accident. We plan to explore
these issues further in future research and hence to recom-
mend improvements to policy and practice in this area.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Jim Hoyland for his assistance record-
ing the expert discussions and to Alison McPherson for so
carefully transcribing the recorded material. Above all we are
extremely grateful to the experts who gave their time so gener-
ously to allow this research to be undertaken. We  acknowledge
support from the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research
Council under grant no. EP/K007580/1 for the research project
Nuclear Risks: Environmental, Financial and Safety (NREFS)
led by Professor Philip J. Thomas.
Appendix  A.
In this Appendix we  present extracts from the transcript of
the expert elucidation meeting. This is presented so as to allow
the reader to see the evidence underpinning the narrative and
conclusions presented in the main body of the paper. In the
Appendix references to expert 1 and expert 2 etc. are merely
provided so as to make it clear that there is a change of voice
within a dialogue. The numbering does not extend beyond a
given text box, so as to prevent an assemblage of one individ-
ual’s views and hence preserve more  strongly the anonymity
promised to the participants. The Appendix is structured in
numbered boxes to allow for easier linkage to the main text.
We adopt the following conventions when presenting the tran-
scripts: [word] here a word has been inferred, as it was omitted.
inaudible or indistinct in the recording; [...] here some tran-
script text has been omitted; and <> denotes where a proper
name has been removed so as to preserve anonymity.
Part  1—comments  on  “loss”
Box 1.1
Risk and insurance expert: “Loss, as a general broad term
doesn’t really mean anything. Loss only means something to
me if the aim then is to compensate an individual for that loss,
and so, we immediately move on to the idea of compensation
and compensation regimes and all the rest of it.
I would argue that they’re designed for the victim and there
are some clear ground rules established within these regimes,
such as, the principles that we all talk about of channelling,
of limited liability, requirement for insurance and so on. [. . .]
Loss, in a sense, has to be, can only be, deﬁned in terms of
what is established in there and what the market is able to
provide cover for. It’s no point having a very wide and indeﬁnite
description of loss if no one, at the end of the day, is prepared
or willing or able to provide cover for it, and pay for it.”
Box 1.2
Regulatory expert 1: “The biggest impact may have come
from something you can’t compensate for. [. . .] You want to
safeguard against that loss, not by compensation but from
stopping it happening.”
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Regulatory expert 2: “If we start from the position of say-
ing what actually of the perceived losses and the actual losses
that people experience following something like Chernobyl or
Fukushima, some proportion of those will turn into things
which are compensated, others are a broader actual categorisa-
tion of loss, which may or may not be compensated. [. . .]  You’ve
got, obviously, things like health effects, some of which are very
obvious, you know, potential cancers, early effects and so on,
but following Chernobyl, there was an enormous amount of
stress and things of that sort, and many people have said that
was actually the biggest health consequence of the accident.
You can look at things like some of the more obvious things, like
immediate loss of industrial output, agricultural output, and so
on, which were clearly things that manifested themselves after
Chernobyl. You can see, you know, loss of livelihood, loss of
housing, you know, if people are relocated and things of that
sort. And then, as you were saying, there’s issues around trust,
there’s issues around, you know, the community, the environ-
ment and so on, which are much woollier, much more difﬁcult
to sort of grasp, and then there are fundamental things like,
you know, in both cases, the loss of power, you know, and the
cost of actually having to compensate for that and produce new
power from different sources.
My contention would be: those things that you can’t compen-
sate for are probably more signiﬁcant to society than those
you can, and that, therefore, the protection methods you put in
place and why you regulate so ﬁercely perhaps, or intrusively,
is because of those wider aspects of society. So, for example,
Fukushima, I know, because I was involved, that the British
Government were looking at the loss to the manufacturing
industry in the UK from loss of supply because that coast of
Japan actually has got a lot of supply industry components
coming from it there. And those things, you can’t compensate.”
Box 1.3
Risk and insurance expert: “I also understand that that sort
of. . .sort of non-priceable stuff has to be factored in to the reg-
ulatory regime to make sure the operator does everything in its
power to be as safe as possible. I just think it’s very difﬁcult to
encapsulate all of it for the purposes of compensation. Where
do you draw the line?”
Part  2—Wider  considerations  of  “loss”
Box 2.1
Legal expert 1: “I suppose the other point, looking at it the
other way, is all the conventions related to third-party loss, so
essentially things off the nuclear site, and the thing we often
forget is the compensation on the nuclear site and the legal
regime that sits around that, which of course is very different.
So, that is obviously. . .what happens on the site affects all these
areas that we’re talking about, but that’s often forgotten and
it’s often a big commercial risk for developers etc.”
Legal expert 2: “I’m coming from a lawyer’s point of view, I
would say nuclear risk and liability really comes to light for us,
on a practical level, in the contracts, when you’re looking at the
potential risk that might appear, let’s say, if an incident hap-
pens, where the kind of potential losses that you mentioned
arise. However, I have to admit, we don’t look as wide as
had already been discussed to the actual losses which have
been suffered on a realistic level. . .or on the ground, especially
in events such as Fukushima. But what we  have as a basis,
is. . .how liability is legally deﬁned, - the ’heads of damage’,
within the conventions themselves, but there is also the issue
of where something isn’t covered by a convention, then would
it be covered by the national law, i.e., as governed by the law of
tort if we’re looking at this country, for example, and then we
start to move into, for example, the law of negligence. [. . .]  To
show that there is a loss, let’s say, in legal terms outside of the
Conventions, then that would then need to be linked in some
way to negligence or to show a duty of care, but also foresee-
ability, causation and other legal principles like that depending
on the tort committed.”
Box 2.2
Regulatory expert: “When I was in the regulator, we  did
some work on sort of expectations and we asked the pseudo-
public about, well, what’s your expectations in nuclear, and the
general response we were getting back was they were largely
untroubled by it in terms of they wanted just to lead their lives
and let the industry get on and do it. [. . .]  So, there is another
side to this argument. And I don’t mean compensated for loss
of work or health reasons but I mean just for loss of their way
of life for several months, several years. Do you compensate
people for that?”
Box 2.3
Risk and insurance expert: “There are the two aspects to
loss, if you like, tort and the actual Nuclear Installations Act,
and then you come to insurers. [Insurers are] always the last
people, and I think that that is where [they] sit – [. . . they] know
what [their] liabilities are because [insurers] can then cost that
and charge that out. Now, it may not be all of the liabilities
because [insurers] can’t actually, as you say, compensate for
that country’s loss of face, whether it’s Japanese face or English
face, doesn’t make any difference, but that’s where [they are]
at. [Insurers] then come in to that part. So, [they are] happy to
do things and provide cover when [they] know what [they are]
doing.”
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Part  3—comments  on  Fukushima-Daiichi  accident
Box 3.1
Regulatory expert: “I mean, from a sort of regulatory indus-
try, scientiﬁc point of view, you know, following the accident,
you have effectively two phases, I think one can say: sort of
an emergency phase, where you’re thinking about how do we
protect people over the ﬁrst week, the ﬁrst couple of weeks, and
you do things – I suspect you haven’t got a great deal of time
to look at the cost-effectiveness of everything. You should have
a good, well worked through emergency plan, if possible, but
I mean, the situation is that it’s probably going to be dictated
by events and by, you know, pressures that emerge from the
details of the accident.
I think you then get into the longer phase. [. . .]  over the longer
term, many  of the things which take place are quite difﬁcult to
justify in terms of their, what I’d broadly say, cost-effectiveness,
and you have to ask why. So, a prime example of that is: people
being relocated. Following Chernobyl, you know, several hun-
dred thousand people were relocated completely away from
Chernobyl. [. . .]  some of the measures look, with the beneﬁt
of hindsight, cost-effective, some of the clean-up measures for
agricultural and urban decontamination and so on, but some of
the more  radical measures, like relocating people in vast num-
bers, very, very difﬁcult to see how that could be cost effectively
justiﬁed. [. . .]  The more important issue is, you know, actually
trying to get a balance between what is cost-effective and actu-
ally responding to the pressures in society and the concerns that
people are expressing.”
Box 3.2
Risk and insurance expert: “The situation there [Japan] is
that they have got about 3,000 claims handlers to actually han-
dle the individual claims that are coming in. They’ve had a lot of
claims come in for fear or mental anguish or whatever you like
to call it. They’ve had.  . .a lot of property claims are now starting
to come in, and that’s the next stage of that, if you like. And, in
between, there are other claims, like the evacuation, and it does
take time to organise and time to make sure there is something
done properly. Now, we, as an insurance industry, are looking
to try and put things in place before it happens. You can never
put enough in place to handle everything, but we do take part
in the emergency exercises. We  sit in a very dark corner, but
we’re there in case, you know, somebody says, ‘Well, what if
I evacuate these people, is that covered under the insurance –
who’s going to pay?’ and we can say, ‘Well, perhaps not us,’ you
know, and things like that! So, you know, there are all of those
situations that we need to get into, and, you know, as you said,
you know, it depends on who’s ordering that evacuation as to
whether it’s something that might or might not be covered. So,
I think, in Fukushima, they’ve responded quite well, but, like
everywhere, it is going to take some time to set up a big enough
operation to do that.”
Box 3.3
Risk and insurance expert: “I think they’re working. [. . .]  It’s
not an insurance event. And you might expect it to be, but in
many countries, insurance is excluded for grave natural disas-
ters. Now, funnily enough, this isn’t a grave natural disaster. I
don’t quite know what would be a grave natural disaster. But
there are two other aspects under the Japanese arrangement -
there were two other exclusions, the tsunami and earthquakes
are the two exclusions, under [. . .] the insurance product that
was taken, and that is because they get a lot of earthquakes in
Japan and so it’s something that the Government looks after,
but they make responsibility of the operator to have that cover
in place for that, or they are responsible for the ﬁrst amount of
that, as they are for tsunamis. Putting it into that box means
that TEPCO were responsible, as opposed to the Government
responsible.
They have a commission in place that does the claims handling,
and, yeah, I think the pool are doing a lot of assistance there
because, you know, they’re the people.  . .insurers, at the end
of the day. Government aren’t insurers, so they don’t have the
expertise to handle claims, and the same as in this country, if
there was a big event and there was a reason why it wasn’t an
insured event, then we would be saying to Government, well,
look, we’re the people that know how to do this – we’ll do it
for you, and we hope that they would say yes. And when you
get to the limit, because there’s a limit on everybody’s policy,
what happens then? The Government then becomes responsible
for the.  . .for the compensation that you’re paying, and again,
you would expect the insurers probably to deal with that. It
might be.  . .lawyers might take it on because I think, to a certain
extent, the Coal Board situation might apply, but I’m not sure
the Government would go along with that because it’s some-
thing they’ve tried and they think there could be a different
way.”
Box 3.4
Regulatory expert: “The emergency management thing, if you
take it very much on the face value, they were very successful
in protecting people from harm from the radiation. There will be
no extra cancers, this is according to the international organ-
isations, that can be detected from that. However, I’ve seen
some information from the Japanese that says there’s 2,900
plus deaths, early deaths, from the impact of the evacuation,
so there is then a question: who insures and is compensat-
able for those deaths? Where, perhaps for very good reasons,
because they didn’t have data, they didn’t know, they had to
take decisions, and so they evacuated people, where, if you sit
back, you might have sheltered some, because people could die
because they’re invalided in homes, they’re frail, or the stress
of moving actually takes them over the edge, and there may
be accidents while you evacuate. So there is a balance there,
and then the question is, well, who makes the decision on the
evacuation? Was it reasonable in the circumstances? And is it
compensatable there? So, there are aspects of that evacuation
that are very interesting actually and, talking to the Japanese
regulator about how they optimise, and then how do you dis-
cuss with people. The problem you get if you say let’s just do
a cost-beneﬁt analysis, and we won’t evacuate so much, you’ll
get self-evacuation.”
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Box 3.5
Regulatory expert 1: “I think there were some governments
who responded inappropriately, if you look at it technically.
The UK Government, to my  mind, responded very effectively
and appropriately. But, also, some of the institutions, the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency, they were slow in giving
information I think. One of the issues is about information ﬂow,
as quickly as you can there. After that, they responded, you
know, sending missions out there.”
Regulatory expert 2: “My  understanding, is that the Japanese
are trying to save or regain the trust and reputation, and by
doing things to a level which is not necessarily appropriate.”
Regulatory expert 3: “Well, I think they will. . .well, one,
they won’t actually address the real hazards, but then, again,
they’re falling into the trap of doing something that’s unrea-
sonable. It’s not technically justiﬁed and it’s done for political
reasons, rather than saying, look, we don’t think it’s right to
get it down to this level because there’s no need because it’s at
that level outside the site, and we can then put those resources
in dealing with the hazards on the site. So, you‘ve got to have
a more  sophisticated argument.”
Regulatory expert 3: “There’s been a very strong precaution-
ary element in almost everything that’s been done. I mean,
particularly in the case of Chernobyl, that was very strongly the
case, and internationally [. . .]  There was this element of trying
to be precautionary, trying to develop trust, try to show people
that you’re doing all that you can. But, back to my  earlier point,
you know, in economic terms, you’re probably spending far too
much money doing that, and that’s where the communication
comes in because all those three things are linked.”
Part  4—comments  on  transboundary  issues
Box 4.1
Risk and insurance expert: “Trans-boundary issues, that’s
a really interesting one. There are moves afoot, based within
the EU, but also from some of the trans-boundary operators,
of developing a pan-European claims management system, so
we’re largely looking at that as a way forward. What we would
do, I don’t know, at this stage. I mean, we’ve got a UK claims
handling system that’s managed by the insurance pool, and
thankfully, we’ve not had to use it, so we can’t really test either
its robustness or whether it would provide the same correct
level of processes that I think we’re seeing in Japan, so. But I
think we need to move into that space relatively quickly after
we implement the current revisions to the Paris Conventions. I
think that’s going to be the next order of action.”
Box 4.2
Legal expert: “Especially in talking about trans-boundary
issues, whether we’re talking about an event on a particular
site that has trans-boundary effects or whether we’ve got mate-
rial in transport, the actual claims management process, there
is the very, very practical element of. . . how you physically deal
with it, [. . .], but also how you deal with which countries, what
claims, and issues like that. [. . .]  Most of the European Member
States, but, not all of them, are members of a liability conven-
tion, but not all the same convention, and then some of them,
say like Ireland, non-nuclear states, are not members. There
are also differences between members of the same convention,
for example the Vienna Convention, providing different levels
of, compensation or other aspects. But even Member States
that are party to the Paris Convention, that we  are a party
to, all have different levels of compensation [. . .]  so what really
would happen on a trans-boundary situation at the moment
is that claims would come ﬂooding in, as we’ve already seen
with Fukushima, for example, and then they’ve all got to be
sorted out. So, the questions to address would be what is the
claim, where has it come from, what convention that individ-
ual’s state is party to, , as in where does the compensation
come from, and at the moment, looking at these issues.  . . this
is where the lawyers really do get excited.”
Box 4.3
Legal expert: “Absolutely, and that’s one of the arguments
that’s given. If we use Ireland as an example, and this is what
<> has been working so hard to do, is to update the implemen-
tation of the Paris Convention in the UK. There’s now a much
wider geographical scope in the Paris Convention, as some of
you will be aware, that enables more claims outside of the Paris
Convention states to be brought – so, at the moment, it’s just
almost like the Paris Convention club, and if you’re in the club,
that’s okay and you can bring a claim, but if you’re not, i.e. a
non-nuclear state, you cannot.
But if we use Ireland as an example, the new geographical scope
of the Paris Convention at least now captures some of these
non-nuclear states subject to the qualifying criteria, but again,
it’s not the whole picture. There’s lots of lawyers now speak-
ing – I suppose it’s becoming, in a way, an old term, about a
global liability regime, requiring that everyone is party to the
same regime, so that we all have the same rules and we know
where we  stand, but it’s still very much. . .and they talk about,
in fact, the ’patchwork’ of conventions, so it’s currently this
mix-match. But the non-nuclear states are ﬁnally being drawn
in but I wouldn’t say it covers the whole picture.”
Box 4.4
Risk and insurance expert: “I don’t think, whether it’s
Ireland or any other non-nuclear country, we would get a ﬂood
of court cases. I don’t believe that at all, you know, because
there’s a cost both ﬁnancial and emotional involved in putting
a court case, and no one does it for fun, I don’t believe. So, I
disagree with that.”
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Box 4.5
Legal expert: “So, I take your point, <>, that people ideally
don’t want to go to court because it is a long process, but there
are certain countries in the world that are far more litigious
than others, and certain citizens of those countries who will
try to bring a claim more  frequently than others, and we saw,
after Fukushima, certain countries saying, right, I’m going to
take myself outside the Fukushima regime, go back to my home
country and bring an action in the courts there. That’s a big
issue for people and particularly for developers, operators and
the like.
The other point I was going to make is, particularly when you’re
looking at developing countries who are just stepping into the
nuclear world, putting conventions in place, there’s sometimes
a political game played of how far they will allow the convention
to apply when they put that into domestic legislation, and so
they may exclude countries nearby that don’t themselves have
a nuclear reactor because that gives them political power in
a particular region, which then brings more complex issues if
there ever was to be a claim in that region, particularly when
the countries are so close together, and Europe would be a good
example of that.”
Box 4.6
Risk and insurance expert: “And I think that. . .I  mean, I’ll
come back to the ﬁrst part of the question, to start with, about
cross-border. Certainly, [insurers] have cross-border arrange-
ments in place so that, if there was a cross-border incident,
[insurers] would get assistance from other countries to settle
the claims. It’s where claims go to, as you’ve just said, and as
the Act is changed, it becomes more apparent where you have
to make that claim I think, and certainly it directs people to
a certain place to make the claim, where the claim occurred,
forgetting transit for the moment because that’s a whole new
ballgame and a difﬁcult one. So, all of these reﬁnements of the
Convention and how they’re interpreted in local Acts is impor-
tant, and I think that the more standardisation you can have,
the better, but we in this country have been very lucky with
the. . .cooperation – no, that’s not the right word, but the way
that the Government have talked to insurers and found exactly
how they are prepared to cover as much as they can, but they
need to have certainty as to what they’re covering. Whereas,
the Convention still leaves things loose, because a Convention
does do that, you know – it’s an international thing and it has
to apply to lots of places. If you can get it a little bit more tied
down, then insurers are happier putting their capital in place,
and I think that’s how we’re doing it here, and, going forward,
will perhaps inﬂuence other countries. But, yes, if we could get
the same Act in all European countries, that would be great, but
I think, you know, law-makers just don’t do that. [. . .]  Every-
body knows where cover starts and ﬁnishes and therefore they
know, if you want to make this claim, you make it against
the site licence holder, obviously, because they’re the person
responsible, but there is cover for that. If it’s outside of those
parameters, then it’s up to the Government to decide what they
want to do about those people.”
Box 4.7
Regulatory expert: “How soon should you provide money
compensation? I think it’s really crucial to do it as earlier as
you can, I mean, because it’s about rebuilding trust through
that because, when people have got hardship, they want some
help in doing that, so it’s important from that. . .trying to rebuild
the trust in society, that people are seeing that there’s a just
response to it, there’s an early response, and that that happens
as quickly as possible. And I know, in some of the emergency
exercises, when the question has come up of the licensee, the
licensee says, well, we’ll give an ex-gratia payment out, and
part of this is a human response to people in distress, but part
of it is also about rebuilding trust there.”
Box 4.8
Risk and insurance expert 1: “And I think that’s another
area where the revised Convention is going to make things eas-
ier, because there are more heads of damage coming in, there’s
more preventative measures and evacuation costs and things
like that will come into the Act, and so therefore there isn’t
uncertainty about it.”
Risk and insurance expert 2: “If we’re allowed to be in the
emergency room, the timeliness is much better. We know where
we’ve got to put our resources. You know, if it’s only for putting
a caravan in a social centre somewhere or a desk in a social
centre somewhere that everybody’s been evacuated to, we know
that, if we can put somebody in that corner, lots of people come
and talk to you.”
Box 4.9
Regulatory expert 1: “Where things sit in relation to the
boundary [. . .] as to where a liability regime stops, but the
ripple effects of any accident go on and on. There are some
fairly obvious ones perhaps from the tighter evacuation zone,
where people have to be re-housed, they’ve lost their land, their
businesses, etc.”
Regulatory expert 2: “Just to close off this thing about where
the bounds are, because one of the things that it brought up in
my mind is. . .is the bound.  . .does it include, and perhaps there’s
a legal view on this – I’m sure there will be – does it include
where people have got psychological harm through their own
unreasonable views, so that you may say a reasonable person
would not have held those views? You know, you. . .okay, we
do observe you having psychological harm, but actually, it’s
not reasonable that you should have done because your fear,
your misconceptions were such that it would be unreasonable
for you to be harmed in that way. Because some people would
be more vulnerable than others, and so, would that be within
the bounds of the heads of. . .?”
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Box 4.10
Legal expert: “Whether those people have got traction or not?
It depends what they’re trying to claim for, and that could deter-
mine, whether we’re talking about Nuclear Liability or not. Of
course, with nuclear liability, we do have the Nuclear Instal-
lations Act to start with, which is always the starting point.
So, it would be looking at the type of loss that person has –
and determining whether that is a head of damage under the
legislation? [. . .]  I suppose just talk generally here, the law of
tort, so we could be looking at where there’d been a duty of care
that’s been breached, negligence acts, economic loss – each has
its own problems in English law. But that’s where you would go.
That’s what I call a normal civil claim. So, if one had suffered a
loss from any incident, whether it was nuclear or not, and there
had been a breach of law, then that individual could go, with
the advice of its lawyers, to the courts. The court would apply
that standard, let’s say, civil law, whatever principles would
apply, regardless of whether it was a nuclear incident or not.
[. . .]  A loss is either covered by the Nuclear Installations Act
or it’s not. If it’s not covered, you would then, as an individ-
ual, look to see where else you could go for support, whether
that was the Government, other compensation put aside, or the
courts themselves.”
Part  5—comments  on  BP  Macondo  incident  2010
Box 5.1
Legal expert1: “The joy about the conventions and how they’re
brought into law is you channel it to the operator. You have
a clear party that you are seeking liability from. Once you go
outside that, you start getting into the question of “Whose fault
is this and where do you go?”
Legal expert2: “And whether they can pay. . .”
Legal expert3: “And whether they can pay! With the Horizon
compensation, BP decided to compensate these people because
of the reputational risk to them and the effect it would have had
on their business going forward if they’d chosen not to do so,
and they said we recognise it’s our fault, we recognise it was
an issue with our plant, and we will compensate. But there is
this problem of how far the insurance markets will help you,
how big a pot of money we have. Without going into particular
companies, but the big oil majors have huge amounts of money
and they are able to compensate – not unlimited, obviously, but
they do have a large pot of cash behind them. Nuclear operators
may not have that pot of cash, depending on which company
you’re looking at. They may not be able to get insurance to
cover the wider liabilities, and simply, it may put them out of
business, which then gives you a different issue of who’s going
to decommission the plant because, if they’re out of business
and they’re not around, you’ve then got a bigger issue to deal
with, which is a plant that’s in trouble and who’s going to deal
with that. So, the reason I believe that the compensation regime
was set up in the way it is, is to make it clear to operators what
their liability is, what they can get covered for, what may be
outside the cover, and then they can make a decision whether
they actually want to be in this business or not.”
Box 5.2
Risk and insurance expert: “The regime and the liability law
is designed to also deal with the everyday incident that might
happen, and the law here is very clear, and will be clearer when
we implement the revised legislation, about what can and can-
not be compensated. There will always be people who will want
to have a go and try and, you know, put a speculative claim in,
but, you know, the courts, certainly in the UK, are sensible, and
I don’t think they’re going to just ignore what is established
in legislation and in law, and just start awarding money left,
right and centre. If there’s a catastrophic accident, in a sense,
the whole game changes – you know, there are political issues
at stake, reputational issues at stake, and in a sense, all bets
are off at that point and given the experience of Fukushima
who can predict what will and won’t be compensated. But for
the purposes of the everyday, I think the law is absolutely clear
on what is and what isn’t compensable.
There’s the human interest story, which is going in the other
direction, and the natural tendency to.  . .for the outsider, not
for the people involved, but for the outsider, to wallow in the
excitement and the misery that is generated by a disaster. . .  I
mean, cynically, that’s probably one reason why we have cor-
respondents that go to disaster zones. It’s not so much to help
the disaster victims, it’s because we want to read about other
people’s woes. . .it’s a sort of Schadenfreude, isn’t it, which is a
terrible thing.”
Part  6—comments  on  trust,  fear  and  responsibility
Box 6.1
Risk and insurance expert: “[Insurers] are happy to cover
things where [they] know what the boundaries are, and [they]
are more into the situation with revised Convention, revised
Paris and revised Nuclear Installations Act, in particular – not
the Convention because it doesn’t tie things down, but [insur-
ers], in this country now, have more idea as to where things
start and ﬁnish, or at least I hope we’re going to have that at
the end of the changes. And, as far as I’m concerned anyway,
and this is personal [. . .], because we won’t know until things
are tested, and it always is left to the courts in the ﬁnal deci-
sion anyway, but if you were talking about somebody who has
bodily injury and therefore suffers some sort of psychological
trauma because of that, then, yeah, I’m sure [insurers would]
be paying compensation for both of those parts of the claim. But
if their aunt who lives in Glasgow, and they’re down in Kent,
where the event occurred, has psychological trauma, [insurers]
wouldn’t be looking to pay that, because it’s not direct, and it’s
therefore indirect, and that’s where the difference comes, and,
you know, I can’t say much more than that.”
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Box 6.2
Risk and insurance expert: “Well, I think we recognise that,
you know, there could and there should be more done at the
front-end of all of this to explain, you know, the impact of radi-
ation and what radiation is and all the rest of it., and it’s not
like we haven’t tried it and we haven’t done it, but I think it
is a very difﬁcult message to. . .for people ﬁrst to understand
and then remember. So, every time you get a story, whether it’s
Fukushima or, you know, traces of polonium found in a restau-
rant it always feels incredibly scary. People also confuse civil
nuclear with military nuclear, so it’s a real tough challenge, but
we do recognise that we need to do more to explain nuclear.”
Box 6.3
Legal expert: “I was just going to say, where we do focus on
this liability, it’s just going back to what <> was saying, we
see an awful lot of this as really being emergency preparedness
basically, but also, if we look back in the past, if we think,
I don’t know, back to the ‘80s, let’s say, before the nuclear
renaissance, the nuclear industry was  very, very secretive or
there was a huge distance between the public and the nuclear
industry, . . .there have been huge steps since.”
Box 6.4
Regulatory expert 1: “There’s a bit of sort of systems thinking
around this that perhaps we need to think about. I mean, the
ﬁrst point is, yeah, you made the point just now that people fear
radioactivity, radiation, and that’s obvious and important and
I don’t know how we deal with it. I know people are looking at
this again at the moment. But that then has an implication
because, when policymakers start thinking about interven-
tion levels and so on, the scientiﬁc sort of analysis sometimes
suggests that it should be quite a lot higher, but lots of con-
servatisms are put into the analysis, for very understandable
reasons. [. . .]  You’re affecting a very large number of people.
And so, you’re actually building on the fear - by including the
fear, you’re developing an even greater level of fear. Some of
that is being done to generate trust. That actually can have an
obverse effect, an inverse effect, because, you know, if then peo-
ple feel later that, you know, they’re not getting the whole truth
or that, in many  cases, you know, they’ve got doses or some-
thing which are higher than those levels, which are artiﬁcially
low, then that’s again going to affect trust, and that happened
a lot I think post-Chernobyl.”
Regulatory expert 2: “I completely agree with what’s been
said about sort of prior understanding about radiation expo-
sures and so on and the risks from it etc. but I do think you
have to remember that the communication after the event,
with the newspapers, is actually going to trigger a lot of your
claims, and so we need a mechanism to actually put appropri-
ate and I think. . .I  can’t think what the word is, but reliable,
trustworthy. . .people who are speaking for the Government, for
the industry, and so on, to make that trust come across to the
newspapers and so on.”
Box 6.5
Regulatory expert 1: “Yeah, but that makes it worse  because
you get.  . .you get all your social media going out and so on. So,
we need to respond in an appropriate manner to the incident
that’s occurred and communicate. It always, to me, it always
comes back to communication. If you want to stop these addi-
tional claims from the other side of the country and so on,
explain how they’re not going to be exposed, but not necessarily
using ICRP speak! ”
(Note: ICRP refers to the International Commission on
Radiological Protection)
Regulatory expert 2: “The ﬁrst thing is that, if people choose
to live around the nuclear plant, and that’s probably predomi-
nantly the population we’re talking about here – there will be
others, but the bulk of them – then it should be clear to them
that the risks, etc. they’re being exposed to and the type of
events that can occur, from any type of releases up to a full-scale
emergency, obviously. So, there should be some expectations set
around that. But, on the other side, there should also be expecta-
tions set about what they could expect if there is an emergency,
in terms of meeting their needs, the sort of things we’ve touched
on, but I don’t think we’ve delved very far. What’s the list of
things. . .what will those things look like, in reality, you know?
You know, you might have to move home or whatever. And
how can they expect those things are going to be addressed
in a timely manner, to come back to your point on timeliness
as well, because that’s going to be crucial, and it picks up <>’s
point earlier, it addresses this loss of trust because, if you set the
expectations right at the start and something does happen, yes,
of course there’s trust lost, but is the trust lost less because there
was that expectation that, well, these things can happen, but
then you have to trigger in the needs will be addressed at that
time and meet those needs that you said will be addressed.”
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